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I. INTRODUCTION
Over the last few years, the Appellate Body of the World Trade
Organization (WTO) has ruled that one of the United States’ methodologies
for calculating antidumping (AD) duties, known as “zeroing,” violates
relevant WTO member treaty obligations.1 Zeroing is “a practice in which
[the Department of] Commerce ignores negative dumping margins —
instances when no dumping is found — when comparing export prices and
normal prices of a given product to calculate an overall dumping margin.”2
After a series of adverse rulings by the WTO with regard to U.S. zeroing
practices, the United States finally began to take the first steps toward
complying with the WTO’s rulings by convincing the European Union to
suspend arbitration proceedings commenced to determine the ways in which
the EU could retaliate against the United States for not complying with the
rulings.3 A few months later, the United States announced a similar deal
with Japan.4
After these announcements, the Department of Commerce (DOC)
released a proposal, which it believed would bring the United States into
1
See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, United States–Continued Existence and Application of
Zeroing Methodology, WT/DS350/AB/R (Feb. 4, 2009) [hereinafter U.S.–Continued Zeroing];
Appellate Body Report, United States—Final Anti-Dumping Measures on Stainless Steel from
Mexico, WT/DS344/AB/R (Apr. 30, 2008) [hereinafter U.S.–Zeroing (Mexico)]; Appellate
Body Report, United States–Measures Relating to Zeroing and Sunset Review,
WT/DS322/AB/R (Jan. 9, 2007) [hereinafter U.S.–Zeroing (Japan)]; Appellate Body Report,
United States–Laws, Regulations and Methodology for Calculating Dumping Margins
(“Zeroing”), WT/DS294/AB/R (Apr. 18, 2006) [hereinafter U.S.–Zeroing (EC)].
2
Commerce Still Mulling Whether It Will Use Zeroing in Some AD Reviews, INSIDE US
TRADE, Jan. 7, 2011, available at 2011 WLNR 396943. A simple qualitative explanation of
zeroing is given as follows:
[I]f a foreign manufacturer has one sale that is ten percent above normal
value (the product at issue is not being dumped) and one sale that is ten
percent below normal value (the product at issue is being dumped) . . . . under
a zeroing methodology, the sale made above normal value is assigned a zero
margin rather than a margin of negative ten percent. The averaging process
then yields a net dumping margin of five percent. This positive margin
triggers the imposition of antidumping duties. . . .
Casey Reeder, Comment, Zeroing in on Charming Betsy: How an Antidumping Controversy
Threatens to Sink the Schooner, 36 STETSON L. REV. 255, 260 (2006). For a good example of
the zeroing methodology, see Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 8, Koyo Seiko Co. v. United
States, 543 U.S. 976 (2004) (No. 04-87), 2004 WL 1638767. See also infra note 46 for a
more qualitative example of zeroing.
3
U.S., EU Reach Deal to Suspend Arbitration Proceedings in Zeroing Case, INSIDE US
TRADE, Sept. 10, 2010, available at 2010 WLNR 17999029.
4
Informal Deadline Looms for U.S. to Start Complying with Zeroing Case, INSIDE US
TRADE, Dec. 24, 2010, available at 2010 WLNR 25331004.
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compliance with the WTO’s anti-zeroing decisions.5 The proposal however,
failed to address a crucial question: whether the DOC would recalculate AD
duties from past reviews that used now WTO-inconsistent methodologies
instead use legal, or WTO-consistent, methodologies.6 Subsequently, the
EU, Japan, and Mexico indicated that they would push the U.S. to recalculate
the AD duties and refund the difference.7 In other words, these countries
wanted the U.S. to go back to instances where it had applied zeroing to
assess AD duties on imports from these countries, recalculate the duties
using a WTO-consistent legal methodology, and then provide refunds to
importers based on the difference between the duties calculated using
zeroing and the duties calculated using a new methodology deemed
acceptable by the WTO.8
There are potential legal problems however, with the DOC retroactively
assessing AD duties and providing refunds to importers. Even if the DOC
would like to go back and recalculate AD duties, two sections of the
Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA),9 the U.S. statute that implements
the Uruguay Round agreements to which the U.S. is a signatory, may prevent
it from doing so. According to Section 129 of the URAA, two criteria must
be met in order to implement adverse WTO decisions.10
First,
implementation of adverse WTO decisions can only apply to unliquidated
entries of goods into the U.S. market.11 Second, implementation of these
decisions can only apply to imports that enter the U.S. “on or after the date
when the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative directs” the DOC to
implement the WTO decisions.12 The potential problems stem from the fact
5

Antidumping Proceedings: Calculation of the Weighted Average Dumping Margin and
Assessment Rate in Certain Antidumping Duty Proceedings, 75 Fed. Reg. 81,533 (Dec. 28,
2010) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. pt. 351).
6
U.S. Still Examining Whether It Will Adjust Past Reviews in Zeroing Cases, INSIDE US
TRADE, Jan. 7, 2011, available at 2011 WLNR 396955 (stating that to comply with “WTO
findings on the use of zeroing in past reviews could require Commerce to go back and
recalculate the final dumping margins in those reviews without using zeroing and then provide
cash refunds to importers that would have faced lower duties. . . .”).
7
Id.
8
For a discussion of alternative methodologies considered by the U.S., see Commerce Still
Mulling Whether It Will Use Zeroing in Some AD Reviews, supra note 2. Because WTOconsistent methodologies that may be used would not “zero out” negative margins, it is
presumed that the tariff rate would be lower using the new methodology.
9
Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4808 (1994) (codified
in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.).
10
Id. § 129.
11
Id. § 129(c)(1).
12
U.S. Still Examining Whether It Will Adjust Past Reviews in Zeroing Cases, supra note 6
(emphasis added).
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that: (1) many of the past AD duties calculated using zeroing “have already
been ‘liquidated,’ or finally assessed and collected, by U.S. Customs and
Border Protection,” and (2) the imports in question have already entered the
U.S. market.13 This Note will focus on the second issue: whether the time at
which the goods entered the U.S. precludes the DOC from being able to
recalculate the duties and provide refunds.
This timing problem was so challenging for the U.S. to overcome that it
continued to resist providing the EU and Japan with retroactively calculated
refunds for several years. On February 6, 2012, after continued settlement
deadline extensions, the U.S. announced that it had reached settlement deals
with both the EU and Japan, and agreed to no longer use zeroing in
administrative reviews.14 However, in what the U.S. considered a major
victory, retroactively calculated refunds were not required under these
deals.15 An anonymous observer stated that this was likely, at least in the EU
case, because of fatigue related to pressing the U.S. on the issue, leading
them to simply give up hope the U.S. would provide refunds.16 In light of
the settlement though, other countries are now coming forward demanding
the U.S. provide refunds to their importers and threatening the new litigation
at the WTO if the U.S. does not.17 Thus, the legal issue of whether the DOC
can actually provide these refunds remains an ongoing concern.
The DOC believes it will not need new legislation from Congress in order
to comply with the rulings.18 Indeed, as will be shown in Part II, domestic
political pressure over concerns of “lost sovereignty” as a result of being a
part of the WTO would make it highly unlikely that any new attempts by
Congress to allow a federal agency more discretion in complying with WTO
law would succeed. Thus, the statute that is analyzed in this Note will be the
URAA and its Statement of Administrative Action (SAA).
The answer to whether the United States can retroactively apply new
methodologies to calculate past AD duty reviews under domestic law has
serious implications. If the U.S. does not retroactively apply a new
methodology, it would contradict the WTO rulings. This would allow WTO
members such as the EU, Japan, and Mexico the legal authority under WTO
law to impose the retaliatory measures that the U.S. has staved off so far.
13

Id.
U.S. Zeroing Deals with EU, Japan Do Not Address Past Uses of Zeroing, INSIDE US
TRADE, Feb. 10, 2012, available at 2012 WLNR 2979036.
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
See, e.g., Korea Moves Ahead with Zeroing Challenge Despite Final Commerce Rule,
INSIDE US TRADE, Feb. 17, 2012, available at 2012 WLNR 3510366.
18
U.S., EU Reach Deal to Suspend Arbitration Proceedings in Zeroing Case, supra note 3.
14
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These measures would likely include tariffs against U.S. goods exported to
these countries.19 Overall, the inability or refusal of the United States to
implement these could decrease the total volume of international trade, and
damage the WTO’s mission to liberalize international trade.
This Note will argue that the DOC can at least make a valid and
persuasive argument that it does have the legal authority under the URAA to
retroactively calculate AD duties that were originally derived using zeroing
and to provide refunds to importers, assuming the entries have not been
liquidated. Part II discusses the background of all the relevant issues,
including the history behind the Uruguay Round agreements and how the
U.S. implemented its provisions through the URAA. The AD issue,
specifically the use of zeroing in assessing AD duties, will be placed into
context, and the peculiarities of the U.S.’ retrospective method of duty
assessment will also be examined. Then this Note will discuss specific
issues behind several WTO cases brought against the U.S. for its use of
zeroing and attempts at compliance—including a look at the first proposal by
the DOC.
Part III will discuss the legality of retroactively calculating AD duties
with new methodologies and of providing refunds to importers. This will be
done by looking at the actual text of the URAA and the text of its SAA.
Issues of statutory interpretation and administrative law, including the
possible elimination of the SAA from the context of a traditional statutory
construction analysis and use of the Charming Betsy canon of statutory
interpretation20 in a Chevron21 analysis will then be examined. Decisions of
the U.S. Court of International Trade and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit will be analyzed as well.
This Note will then draw the conclusion that the DOC at least has a strong
argument that it can legally recalculate AD duties retroactively and provide
refunds to importers. Finally, Part IV summarizes the argument and
examines the implications of U.S. compliance versus non-compliance. This
Note concludes by discussing the overall implication of this issue for the
WTO’s future and the liberalization of international trade. Overall, the legal
issue of retroactive calculation is a good case study of the interaction
between U.S. domestic law and international law and illuminates some of the
problems that can arise when implementing legislation is used in lieu of selfexecuting treaties.

19

See id. (noting that prior to its initial deal with the U.S., the EU requested two different
types of tariffs as retaliation in cases similar to those of Japan and Mexico).
20
Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804).
21
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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II. BACKGROUND
A. The Uruguay Round Agreements and the U.S.’ Implementing
Legislation—The Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA)
No effective discussion of the issue at hand can take place without a basic
knowledge of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and its
progeny leading to the formation of WTO. In the immediate aftermath of
World War II, international leaders, mostly from the U.S. and Great Britain,
crafted the GATT with hopes that establishing such a multilateral trading
regime would facilitate world peace.22 The GATT was not seen as creating
an organization, but simply as a contract with specific aims.23 However,
after talks for a so-called International Trade Organization collapsed, the
scope of the GATT expanded far beyond the notion of a simple contract
between nations.24
The GATT, despite its original purpose, proved durable over time through
a series of trade rounds that progressively curtailed tariffs and other barriers
to trade, and simultaneously created a complex set of rules meant to increase
free trade around the world.25 The trade round known as the Uruguay
Round, the negotiations for which began in September 1986 and concluded
in April 1994 with the Marrakesh Agreement,26 and the U.S.’s implementing
legislation—is what concerns this Note. An important element of the
Uruguay Round’s results was the fact that it was a “single package,”
meaning each nation would be required to accept the Uruguay Round results
in their entirety, as opposed to the GATT’s “à la carte” approach.27
Substantively, the Uruguay Round negotiations produced two main changes:
(1) the creation of the WTO, and (2) a new system for settling disputes
within the WTO, the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB).28
After the U.S. signed the Marrakesh Agreement, implementing legislation
still had to be crafted and approved by Congress.29 Although the U.S. had an
22
DOUGLAS A. IRWIN, PETROS C. MAVROIDIS & ALAN O. SYKES, THE GENESIS OF THE GATT
197 (2008).
23
JOHN H. JACKSON, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF GATT AND THE WTO: INSIGHTS ON TREATY
LAW AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS 23 (2000).
24
Id.
25
Id. at 373.
26
Id. at 375.
27
Id.
28
Id. at 375–76 (noting that the DSB includes the formation of panels when disputes arise
and a appellate review system).
29
See id. at 377–79, 391–94 (detailing Congressional procedure for voting on trade
agreements, why the U.S. needed implementing legislation for the Marrakesh Agreement, and
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obligation on an international level to abide by the Marrakesh Agreement,
this by itself did not create any obligations at the domestic level; such
domestic obligations could only come about through Congress passing
legislation implementing the Marrakesh Agreement.30 In other words, the
Uruguay Round Agreements were “not self-executing and thus their legal
effect in the United States is governed by implementing legislation.”31
An overarching theme concerning the implementation of the Uruguay
Round Agreements, not only in the U.S. but around the world, was the
debate over “lost sovereignty.”32 In fact, debate in the U.S. about the
possibility of lost U.S. sovereignty was so severe that the Clinton
Administration felt that it needed to make clear how the Uruguay Round
agreements affected domestic law.33 Thus, the need for implementing
legislation left open the possibility for conflict between the responsibilities
that the U.S. had at the international level, as a signatory of the Marrakesh
Agreement, and what the U.S. had legal authority to do under domestic
implementing legislation. Thus, specific provisions of the URAA were
included to placate those who feared this occurrence.34
Overall, the Uruguay Round and the creation of the WTO have been a
boon to international trade. However, the legal issues surrounding the WTO
continue to this day as the WTO’s panel reports and Appellate Body reports
aggregated to create a vast body of WTO jurisprudence.35 This jurisprudence
and the founding documents of the WTO are what guide member countries
when considering trade actions. One of the trade actions that has embroiled
countries in much WTO litigation is dumping and the remedies available for
countries that are victims of it.

the possibility of a “WTO Dispute Settlement Review Commission”).
30
William J. Aceves, Lost Sovereignty? The Implications of the Uruguay Round Agreements,
19 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 427, 462–63 (1995).
31
S. REP. NO. 103-412, at 13 (1994).
32
See, e.g., JACKSON, supra note 23, at 379–81 (describing the fear of “lost sovereignty”).
See generally Aceves, supra note 30 (describing the fear of “lost sovereignty”); Samuel C.
Straight, Note, GATT and NAFTA: Marrying Effective Dispute Settlement and the Sovereignty
of the Fifty States, 45 DUKE L.J. 216 (1995) (discussing how to have the WTO and prevent
“lost sovereignty”).
33
Aceves, supra note 30, at 428–29.
34
See Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Less than Zero: The Effects of Giving Domestic Effect to WTO
Law, 6 LOY. U. CHI. INT’L L. REV. 279, 283 (2008) (discussing how certain provisions of
URAA were crafted in order to limit the effect of the WTO on U.S. domestic law thus
preserving sovereignty despite the WTO’s creation).
35
ANDREW T. GUZMAN & JOOST PAUWELYN, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 115 (2009).
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B. The Antidumping Issue and the U.S. Methodology of Zeroing in
Calculating Antidumping Duties
Dumping has been an identifiable problem in international trade for quite
some time, predating even the GATT.36 Dumping, on a theoretical level,
occurs “when similar products are sold by a firm in an export market for less
than what is charged in the home market. Alternatively, it may occur if the
export price of the product is less than total average costs or marginal
costs.”37 In other words, dumping occurs when a business entity in one
country exports a product at a price below its market price in the exporter’s
home country. This is harmful because the exporting firm can continue to
sell at below-market-value, price its competition in the importing country out
of business, and then raise prices without the fear of having any competitors
to force prices down.
Despite the GATT’s purpose of liberalizing international trade, a specific
provision38 was included to allow antidumping duties “so long as the
contracting parties can prove that such dumping of goods is causing or
threatens to cause ‘material injury’ to competing industries in the importing
country.”39 This remains the basic structure under the Marrakesh Agreement
for allowing a country to impose antidumping duties.40 The Antidumping
Agreement (ADA), an agreement to which all WTO-member countries are
bound, contains additional requirements. Among these is a “sunset clause”
by which all AD actions will come under review and be ended after five
years.41 The ADA requires the following be satisfied in order for AD duties
to be lawfully imposed: the exports must be sold at less than normal value,
the exports must cause or threaten to cause material injury to the domestic
import-competing industry, and there must be a clear causal link between the
injury to the domestic industry and dumping.42
U.S. law also stipulates when AD duties will be rendered on imports; the
primary requirements are that products are sold at a less-than-fair value and a
U.S. industry is “materially injured or threatened with material injury”
36

See generally JACOB VINER, DUMPING: A PROBLEM IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE (1923)
(arguing that dumping is a problem and should be addressed).
37
Bernard M. Hoekman & Michael P. Leidy, Dumping, Antidumping and Emergency
Protection, 23 J. WORLD TRADE 27 (1989).
38
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. 6, para. 1, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55
U.N.T.S. 194.
39
K.D. RAJU, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION AGREEMENT ON ANTI-DUMPING: A
GATT/WTO AND INDIAN LEGAL JURISPRUDENCE 14 (2008).
40
Id.
41
Id. at 35.
42
Id.
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because of a dumped product.43 The DOC determines the amount of AD
duties by calculating the margin of dumping, which is “ ‘the amount by
which the normal value exceeds the export price or constructed export price
of the subject merchandise.’ ”44 The AD duties are meant be equivalent to
the margin of dumping, no more and no less.45
The U.S. has been using a methodology known as “zeroing” to calculate
AD duties.46 While the practice has received a considerable amount of
condemnation,47 particularly from political conservatives who argue that
zeroing is simply a façade for protectionist impulses,48 it has clearly been the
preferred methodology for calculating AD duties in the U.S. The U.S.
Government has defended its practice in litigation,49 although the
methodology is not mandated by U.S. law.50 However, the use of zeroing by
the U.S. and other countries has come under fire at the WTO, where the
Appellate Body has determined it to be illegal.51 The string of zeroing cases
against the U.S. which are at issue here are not exceptions.
C. The U.S. System of Duty Assessment
The system the U.S. employs to assess AD duties on imports is a fairly
intricate one. Just one AD proceeding involves multiple stages, starting with
an “original investigation,” followed by “annual administrative reviews and
five-year sunset reviews.”52 Additional reviews can also be requested to get
43
JEANNE J. GRIMMETT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32014, WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT:
STATUS OF U.S. COMPLIANCE IN PENDING CASES 51 (2011). See 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (2006) for
the full text.
44
GRIMMETT, supra note 43. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(35)(A) (2006) for the full text.
45
19 U.S.C. § 1673e(a) (2006).
46
Commerce Still Mulling Whether It Will Use Zeroing in Some AD Reviews, supra note 2.
47
See, e.g., Daniel J. Ikenson, Zeroing In: Antidumping’s Flawed Methodology Under Fire,
FREE TRADE BULL. (CATO Inst/ Center for Trade Pol’y Stud., Wash. D.C.), Apr. 27, 2004, at 1
(calling zeroing “egregious” and “a significant cause of the systemic overestimation of
dumping margins and subsequent application of inflated antidumping duties”).
48
See Daniel J. Ikenson, Protection Made to Order: Domestic Industry’s Capture and
Reconfiguration of U.S. Antidumping Policy, TRADE POL’Y ANALYSIS (CATO Inst./Center for
Trade Pol’y Stud. Wash. D.C.), Dec. 21, 2010, at 1 (arguing that antidumping policy is
designed to punish foreign competition rather than truly predatory practices).
49
See, e.g., SKF USA Inc. v. United States, 31 Ct. Int’l Trade 951 (2007), aff’d, 537 F.3d
1373 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Corus Staal BV v. Dep’t of Commerce, 395 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir.
2005); Timken Co. v. United States, 354 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
50
GRIMMETT, supra note 43, at 55.
51
See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, European Communities–Anti-Dumping Duties on
Imports of Cotton-Type Bed Linen from India, WT/DS141/AB/R (Mar. 1, 2001) [hereinafter
EC–Bed Linen] (detailing the first WTO case to rule the zeroing practice to be illegal).
52
GRIMMETT, supra note 43.
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an AD order revoked when circumstances have changed.53 The two parts of
an AD investigation that most concern this Note are original investigations
and annual administrative reviews.
Original investigations are exactly what the name implies—a preliminary
investigation conducted by the DOC, usually on the basis of a petition by an
industry that claims to be affected by dumped products, to determine whether
in fact there are products being dumped.54 The DOC typically investigates
whether dumping has occurred by examining the product sold for a specified
period of time, generally the four most recent fiscal quarters.55 After this
year-long investigation, the DOC makes a determination as to whether
dumping has in fact occurred.56 If the DOC determines that dumping has
occurred, it will assess an AD duty and require the relevant importer to place
a cash deposit with the DOC for each subsequent entry.57
The original investigation of dumping is not the end of the entire process.
The U.S. employs a “retrospective” system in its assessment of import
duties, where an importer’s ultimate liability for antidumping duties is
determined after goods are already imported.58 Thus, the DOC employs
annual administrative reviews to calculate the final AD duty rate for
previously imported goods.59
As such, the DOC will conduct an
administrative review no earlier than one year from the date the original
investigation concluded that AD duties were appropriate, if so requested by
the importer.60 The DOC will again examine the four previous fiscal
quarters to determine if dumping is still occurring. If the affected importer
has not requested an administrative review after one year from the
conclusion of the original investigation, the DOC will simply use the rate
applicable when the imports originally entered the U.S. and will liquidate the
entries at that amount.61 If, however, the DOC determines in the

53

Id.
Id. at 52.
55
19 C.F.R. § 351.204(b)(1) (2011).
56
19 U.S.C. § 1673d(a) (2006); 19 C.F.R. § 351.210 (2011).
57
19 U.S.C. §§ 1673b(d)(1)(B), 1673d(c)(1)(B)(ii). These cash deposits accrue until a final
AD duty rate is determined; however, the DOC may charge interest on the deposits. See 19
C.F.R. § 351.212(e) (2011) (stating “the Secretary [of the DOC] will instruct the Customs
Service to calculate interest for each entry on or after the publication of the order from the
date that a cash deposit is required to be deposited for the entry through the date of liquidation
of the entry”).
58
19 C.F.R. § 351.212(a) (2011).
59
GRIMMETT, supra note 43, at 55.
60
19 C.F.R. § 351.213(b)(1) (2011).
61
GRIMMETT, supra note 43, at 53.
54
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administrative review that dumping has still been occurring, they will apply
the new dumping margin and liquidate at that amount.62
This peculiar retrospective system of AD duty assessment is a main cause
of the legal controversy at issue. Among WTO member countries, the U.S.
is in the minority since most WTO member countries use a prospective
system that forgoes administrative reviews and simply applies a fixed AD
duty from the conclusion of the AD investigation onward prospectively.63
The countries who challenged the U.S. at the WTO argue that if the DOC
implements an adverse WTO ruling that changes the methodology by which
it calculates AD duties, the U.S. should recalculate AD duties for prior
unliquidated entries for which administrative reviews are ongoing. Even
though the imports entered the country before implementation of the WTO
ruling, because those duties are still in the process of being conclusively
calculated they should fall under the purview of the WTO’s ruling.64
D. WTO Jurisprudence on Zeroing: Three Examples
In the cases where U.S. zeroing was challenged, the WTO did indeed
strike down the U.S.’s practice, but they were not the first to strike down
zeroing in general.65 In fact, the U.S. was not even the first party to have its
use of zeroing struck down by the DSU; the Appellate Body first ruled that
the zeroing methodology violated the ADA in EC–Bed Linen,66 which
involved India’s challenge to AD duties imposed on imports of Indian bed
linen by the European Communities (EC).67 The legal reasoning behind the
decision is beyond the scope of this Note, but the DSU—both in the panel
report and Appellate Body report—found that the EC’s use of zeroing was a
violation of Article 2.4.2 of the ADA.68 It is worth noting that in that case
the U.S. supported the EC’s use of zeroing.69 It is also worth noting that in
Corus Staal,70 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit examined
62

19 C.F.R. § 351.212(c)(1)(i) (2011).
Kyle Bagwell & Petros C. Mavroidis, Beating Around (The) Bush, AMERICAN LAW
INSTITUTE 2 (2004), http://www.ali.org/doc/wto/wto2002/Uruguay%20Rounds.pdf.
64
U.S. Still Examining Whether It Will Adjust Past Reviews in Zeroing Cases, supra note 6.
65
U.S.–Continued Zeroing, supra note 1; U.S.–Zeroing (Japan), supra note 1; U.S.–
Zeroing (EC), supra note 1; U.S.–Stainless Steel (Mexico), supra note 1.
66
EC–Bed Linen, supra note 51, ¶ 86.
67
Kathleen W. Cannon, Trade Litigation Before the WTO, NAFTA, and U.S. Courts: A
Petitioner’s Perspective, 17 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 389, 428 (2009).
68
EC–Bed Linen, supra note 51, ¶ 66.
69
Id. ¶ 40.
70
Corus Staal BV v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 259 F. Supp. 2d 1253, 1263–64 (Ct. Int’l
Trade 2003), aff’d, 395 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
63
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the zeroing methodology and found that the Appellate Body’s EC–Bed Linen
holding, was simply one interpretation of an international agreement that did
not bind U.S. courts. Instead, a “court should defer to the domestic
interpretation” even if its domestic statute is ambiguous.71 It seems the U.S.
went to substantial lengths to continue the use of its zeroing methodology.
Subsequent to EC–Bed Linen, the WTO’s DSU “explicitly struck down”
the U.S.’s use of zeroing in all stages of the DOC’s AD assessment process.72
In US–Zeroing (EC), the Appellate Body found that the practice of zeroing
as carried out by the U.S. in original investigations was inconsistent with
Article 2.4.2 of the ADA, much in the same way the EC’s practice of zeroing
in the EC–Bed Linen case did.73 In US–Zeroing (Japan), the Appellate Body
found that the U.S.’s use of zeroing in periodic reviews was inconsistent with
Articles 2.4 and 9.3 of the ADA and Article VI(2) of the 1994 GATT.74 The
Appellate Body reiterated these rulings in US–Stainless Steel (Mexico),
finding that, facially, the U.S.’s use of zeroing in periodic reviews violated
Article VI(2) of the GATT and Article 9.3 of the ADA.75 All three of these
cases suggest that in order to comply with the WTO rulings, the U.S. would
have to go back to the challenged instances of zeroing, recalculate the duties
using a WTO-consistent methodology, and then issue refunds for the
difference accordingly.76 After these rulings, the DOC finally stated publicly
that it intended to comply with the WTO Appellate Body’s rulings by
eliminating its zeroing practice in original investigations.77
E. The Department of Commerce’s Initial Proposal and Surrounding Issues
In December 2010, the DOC published a proposal that it hoped would
bring the U.S. into compliance with the Appellate Body’s rulings regarding
the practice of zeroing.78 However, the proposal met with stiff resistance
from the European Union, Mexico, and Japan.79 A primary reason these
parties objected to the U.S. proposal was that it did not include a provision

71

Cannon, supra note 67.
Id.
73
U.S.–Zeroing (EC), supra note 1, ¶ 263(iii); see also EC–Bed Linen, supra note 51, ¶ 66.
74
U.S.–Zeroing (Japan), supra note 1, ¶ 177.
75
U.S.–Zeroing (Mexico), supra note 1, ¶ 133.
76
U.S. Still Examining Whether It Will Adjust Past Reviews in Zeroing Cases, supra note 6.
77
U.S., EU Reach Deal to Suspend Arbitration Proceedings in Zeroing Case, supra note 3.
78
Antidumping Proceedings: Calculation of the Weighted Average Dumping Margin and
Assessment Rate in Certain Antidumping Duty Proceedings, 75 Fed. Reg. 81,533 (Dec. 28,
2010) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. pt. 351).
79
U.S. Still Examining Whether It Will Adjust Past Reviews in Zeroing Cases, supra note 6.
72
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for retroactively recalculating AD duties that were initially formulated using
zeroing.80
The U.S. responded that it was not sure retroactively applying new AD
duty calculation methodologies was legal under U.S. domestic law.81 As
previously stated, the potential problems stem from the fact that (1) many of
the past AD duties calculated using zeroing “have already been ‘liquidated,’
or finally assessed and collected, by U.S. Customs and Border Protection,”
and (2) the goods in question in these WTO challenges have likely already
entered the U.S. market.”82 These potential legal problems stem from
provisions of Section 129 of the URAA.83
As of publication, the U.S. has reached deals with both the EU and
Japan.84 These deals do not require the U.S. to retroactively calculate past
duties and provide refunds to these countries’ importers, and neither the EU
nor Japan will seek retaliatory measures as long as the U.S. follows the terms
of the deals.85 However, the U.S. is quickly realizing that the issue will not
go away easily. Soon after the deals with the EU and Japan were announced,
South Korea said that it would pursue actions at the WTO in order to force
the U.S. to retroactively calculate duties with non-zeroing methodologies and
provide refunds to South Korean importers.86 South Korea would likely be
victorious in such an action.87 Thus, this is still a significant legal issue and

80

Id.
Id.
82
Id.
83
Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-316, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994) (codified
in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.). As a side note, but one that should be addressed to avoid
possible confusion, countries employing prospective systems of duty assessment that have had
their zeroing practices struck down would not find themselves in the legal gray area in which
the U.S. currently finds itself. In countries that use a prospective system of duty assessment,
duties would have already been finally and conclusively calculated. Thus, if the WTO’s DSU
ruled that such a country could no longer use zeroing, this would clearly have no impact on
past incidents of duty assessment where zeroing was used. This is because, unlike the cases at
issue in the U.S., there would be no ongoing investigation and hence no question about
whether or not the government had an obligation to return any refunds to importers. If there
were such an obligation, then theoretically importers who were overcharged because of
zeroing decades ago could then demand refunds in a prospective system. The legal gray area
in which the U.S. finds itself is so murky precisely because this is a rather unique question of
U.S. administrative law and statutory interpretation. See Bagwell & Mavroidis, supra note 63.
84
U.S. Zeroing Deals with EU, Japan Do Not Address Past Uses of Zeroing, supra note 14.
85
Id.
86
Korea Moves Ahead with Zeroing Challenge Despite Final Commerce Rule, supra note
17 (“The fact that the United States refused to give refunds to the EU or Japan does not
convince South Korea to reconsider its WTO case at this stage, [a] Korean official said. . . . ).
87
Id.
81
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it is important that the U.S. try to find a way to provide such refunds as more
countries seek them.
III. THE LEGAL PROBLEM: DOES SECTION 129(C)(1) ALLOW FOR
RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF ALTERNATIVE METHODOLOGIES?
A. The Legal Framework
The origins of this issue of statutory interpretation and administrative law
can be traced to a case Canada brought against the U.S. at the WTO in
2001.88 In that case, Canada explicitly challenged the language of Section
129(c)(1) of the URAA, arguing that when the DOC makes a finding in an
AD proceeding that is subsequently found by the DSB to be WTO
inconsistent, this section of the URAA prevents the U.S. from fully
complying with the WTO decision.89 Canada argued that 129(c)(1)prevented
the refund of “estimated duties [importers] deposited with [U.S. Customs and
Border Protection] before the date that the Section 129 Determination is
implemented. In other words, because the duty deposits supported by the
challenged determination would no longer have a WTO-consistent basis,
Canada argued that they must be returned.”90 Although the WTO panel that
decided the case did not reach the merits because it concluded that Canada
had not met its evidentiary burden, the case is nevertheless important. In the
case Canada stated:
The United States argues that Section 129(c)(1) would not
preclude the [DOC] from making final duty liability
determinations in an administrative review on a basis
consistent with a DSB ruling in methodology cases, even
insofar as the determinations would apply to prior unliquidated
entries.
However, the US claim that the [DOC] has
“administrative discretion” to change its interpretation is
inconsistent with US principles of statutory construction, as
well as the wording of the SAA.
As Canada understands US principles of statutory
construction, the issue of whether the limitation in section
129(c)(1) could be nullified or ignored by the [DOC] in a
subsequent administrative review would ultimately be decided
88

Panel Report, United States–Section 129(c)(1) of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act,
WT/DS221/R (July 15, 2002) [hereinafter U.S.–Section 129(c)(1) URAA].
89
Id.
90
GRIMMETT, supra note 43, at 11.
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by the US courts, and not by the [DOC]. As US courts have
explained, a court “cannot presume that Congress intended
[one result] with one hand, while reducing it to a veritable
nullity with the other”. For this reason, US courts would be
unlikely to afford deference to the [DOC’s] interpretation of
section 129(c)(1) in a subsequent administrative review.
Although “[j]udicial deference to agency. . . interpretation is
normally justified by the agency’s expertise in the regulated
subject matter [if the] issue is a pure question of statutory
construction [it is an issue] for the courts to decide.”91
Thus, although the U.S. believed, or at least argued, that the DOC could
potentially refund importers of prior unliquidated entries and still be in
compliance with section 129(c)(1), Canada clearly thought differently based
upon its own understanding of American statutory interpretation and
administrative la.92 This shows that the DOC’s uncertainty about whether or
not it can provide refunds to the EU, Japan, and Mexico right now traced
back to a legal argument it made ten years ago at the WTO.
Although the WTO panel did not weigh in, the issue has once again flared
up, and the debate between Canada and the U.S. in the case above provides a
nice starting point for legal analysis aimed at determining whether the DOC
can in fact recalculate these duties and provide refunds to the importers.
The first point of analysis is to examine the legislative history of the
URAA. Because traditional tools of legislative history, such as public
debates in Congress, are lacking with regards to this specific provision of the
URAA, this section will focus almost exclusively on the Statement of
Administrative Action (SAA) that accompanies the URAA and was
referenced by Canada in its arguments before the WTO panel.
B. The Uruguay Round Agreements Act’s Statement of Administrative
Action: Simple Legislative History or Binding Domestic Law?
As described in Part II, the URAA was approved by Congress using a fast
track approach.93 Thus, in order to pass implementing legislation in the U.S.,
then President Clinton had to submit a statement of administrative action
(SAA).94 According to the Senate Committee on Finance, the SAA’s95
91
U.S.–Section 129(c)(1) URAA, supra note 88, ¶¶ 3.31–.32 (emphasis in original)
(citations omitted).
92
Id. ¶ 3.32.
93
JACKSON, supra note 23, at 377–78.
94
See 19 U.S.C. § 2112(d) (1994) (stating “[w]henever the President enters into a trade
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purpose was to outline administrative and regulatory changes that would be
made in order to implement the Marrakesh Agreement.96 Despite this
statement of intent, the SAA goes further than simply summarizing
changes.97 The URAA’s SAA contains a unique provision that makes it
superior to any other extrinsic source in interpretive authority.98 Buys and
Isasi note this is the only instance in which Congress has so explicitly
mandated courts abide by an SAA.99
Interestingly, Congress “approved” the SAA, stating that “Congress
approves — (1) the trade agreements . . . and (2) the statement of
administrative action proposed to implement the agreements . . . .” Thus, the
question naturally arises as to what this congressional “approval” means in
terms of its potential binding authority. 100 Buys and Isasi offer five possible
meanings of “approval,” ultimately concluding that “Congress . . . attempted to
give the SAA some sort of elevated status in statutory interpretation by the
courts,” but probably did not intend it to have equal status to the statute
itself.101
In fact, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which has
jurisdiction over the Court of International Trade, has already determined
once before that the SAA may be overridden if it conflicts with the language
of the URAA.102 In AK Steel Corp. v. United States,103 the court grappled
agreement under this section providing for the harmonization, reduction, or elimination of a
barrier to . . . international trade, he shall submit such agreement, together with a draft of an
implementing bill . . . and a statement of any administrative action proposed to implement
such agreement, to the Congress . . . .”).
95
Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Statement of Administrative Action, H.R. REP. NO.
103-316 (1994) [hereinafter SAA].
96
S. REP. NO. 103-412, at 1 (1994).
97
Cindy G. Buys & William Isasi, An “Authoritative” Statement of Administrative Action:
A Useful Political Invention or A Violation of the Separation of Powers Doctrine?, 7 N.Y.U. J.
LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 73, 80 (2003).
98
Id. at 82–83. See 19 U.S.C. § 3512(d) (2006) (stating “[t]he statement of administrative
action approved by the Congress . . . shall be regarded as an authoritative expression by the
United States concerning the interpretation and application of the Uruguay Round Agreements
and this Act in any judicial proceeding in which a question arises concerning such
interpretation or application”).
99
Buys & Isasi, supra note 97, at 83.
100
19 U.S.C. § 3511(a) (2006).
101
Buys & Isasi, supra note 97, at 86. The authors justify their conclusion by noting that
Congress did not codify the SAA into statute; “Congress asks a court to look to the SAA only
when a question of interpretation of application arises under the law, indicating that the statute
is superior to the SAA”; and, Congress approves the SAA in the same section in which it
approves the WTO Agreements, but Congress clearly does not intend the WTO agreements
per se to be part of U.S. law. Id.
102
Id. at 109–11.
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with whether the test used before the URAA but which the language of the
URAA changed, was appropriate after the passage of the URAA. The only
reason the case was not clear-cut was because the SAA stated that
“notwithstanding this change in terminology, no change is intended.”104 The
court in AK Steel Corp. determined that the plain language of the statute
overrode the seemingly contradictory language of the SAA.105 Thus, that
case stands for the proposition that when a provision of the URAA—even if
the provision might be ambiguous—appears to contradict the language of the
SAA interpreting that URAA provision, the explicit language of the URAA
prevails.106
In terms of the SAA’s interpretation of Section 129(c)(1) of the URAA,
the SAA explicitly states that decisions by the DSU are to be given
prospective effect only.107 The SAA also states that AD duties altered or
revoked due to the implementation of an adverse WTO decision shall not
apply to imported goods that entered the country prior to the U.S. Trade
Representative’s (USTR) direction to implement the decision.108 Thus,
whether the DOC can retroactively calculate AD duties and provide refunds
to importers would seem to hinge on how much interpretive weight is to be
given to the SAA.
It should be noted at this point that the U.S. Court of International Trade
(CIT), a federal court equivalent to a U.S. district court that hears challenges
to U.S. trade issues and whose rulings are appealed to the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit,109 has been hesitant to read Section 129(c)(1)
to allow the retroactive recalculation of prior unliquidated entries and
refunds to importers. In a February 2010 case, Andaman Seafood Co., Ltd. v.
United States, a private party importer sued the DOC arguing that refusal to
alter AD duty determinations of prior unliquidated entries imported before
the implementation of an adverse WTO ruling was impermissible under

103

226 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
SAA, supra note 95, at 822–23.
105
AK Steel Corp., 226 F.3d at 1374.
106
Buys & Isasi, supra note 97, at 109–11.
107
GRIMMETT, supra note 43, at 11 (“Consistent with the principle that GATT panel
recommendations apply only prospectively, subsection 129(c)(1) provides that where
determinations by . . . Commerce are implemented under subsections (a) or (b), such
determinations have prospective effect only. That is, they apply to unliquidated entries of
merchandise entered, or withdrawn from warehouse, for consumption on or after the date on
which the Trade Representative directs implementation. . . .”).
108
Id. (“Under 129(c)(1), if implementation of a WTO report should result in the revocation
of an antidumping or countervailing duty order, entries made prior to the date of Trade
Representative’s direction would remain subject to potential duty liability.”).
109
28 U.S.C. § 1581 (2009).
104
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Section 129.110 The CIT ruled that the DOC’s interpretation of the statute—
that it apply only prospectively from the date the USTR directs
implementation and that the DOC is not required to retroactively calculate
AD duties for prior unliquidated entries calculated using now WTOinconsistent methods—was indeed a permissible interpretation of the
statute.111 At the same time, CIT did not rule out the possibility that the
DOC could interpret the statute to allow for retroactive recalculation of past
AD duties for which refunds could then be given.112
However, in a subsequent case, NSK Bearings Europe Ltd. v. United
States, the CIT stated in dicta that “[e]ven were a Section 129 procedure to
be initiated now or in the near future, it could not apply to entries made prior
to a date on which the [USTR] directs the [DOC] to implement the WTO
decision.”113
In Corus Staal BV v. United States, the CIT issued its most expansive
ruling to date by holding that the URAA prohibits retroactive recalculation of
prior unliquidated entries.114 As a later case summarized it:
[t]he Court held that Corus’s claim was unlikely to succeed on
the merits because ‘Section 129 specifically says that any
determination made pursuant to that provision applies
prospectively, i.e., to merchandise entered or withdrawn from
warehouse for consumption on or after the date of
implementation.’ While the Section 129 Determination was
implemented on April 23, 2007, the entries in question entered
between November 1, 2005 and October 31, 2006. Thus, the
Court noted that the implementation of the Section 129
Determination on April 23, 2007 had no impact on the subject
entries because they entered or were withdrawn from
warehouse prior to the revocation date.115

110
Andaman Seafood Co. v. United States, 675 F. Supp. 2d 1363, 1365 (Ct. Int’l Trade
2010).
111
Id. at 1369.
112
Id. (“[W]hether the agency may reasonably interpret the statute to apply to all
unliquidated entries of subject merchandise [is] a question the court need not and does not
decide here. . . .”).
113
NSK Bearings Europe Ltd. v. United States, No. 10-00289, slip op. 10-118, at 4 n.3 (Ct.
Int’l Trade Oct. 15, 2010) (citations omitted).
114
See Corus Staal BV v. United States, 31 Ct. Int’l Trade 826, 829, 838 (2007) (noting that
URAA Section 129 was designed to recalculate dumping margins in specific cases but that it
did not commit the DOC to recalculate prior liquidated entries).
115
Corus Staal BV v. United States, 593 F. Supp. 2d 1373, 1379 n.14 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2008)
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The Federal Circuit has not directly interpreted Section 129(c)(1). In
addition, in all the aforementioned cases, it is important to recognize that the
DOC was arguing for the legality of its position that it had the legal authority
to not recalculate AD duties for prior unliquidated entries and provide
refunds. There is no case law that determines the legality of the DOC taking
the position that it could retroactively calculate AD duties of prior
unliquidated entries and provide refunds.
C. Analysis Under the Chevron Doctrine
Having contextualized the legal framework, this Note now turns to the
specific legal question at issue. The best approach for analyzing whether the
DOC can retroactively calculate past AD duties for prior unliquidated entries
and provide refunds to importers under Section 129(c)(1) is to analyze it
under the Chevron doctrine. This analytical framework is derived from an
opinion of the U.S. Supreme Court of the same name, Chevron v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc.116 In that case, the Court developed a
formula for determining whether a federal administrative agency’s
interpretation of a statute is permissible. The first step under this framework
is to determine “whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question
at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear . . . the court, as well as the agency,
must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”117
However, if this is not the case, “if the statute is silent or ambiguous with
respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the
agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.”118
1. Step One of the Chevron Analysis
When conducting step one of a Chevron analysis, it is important to
remember that Chevron does not require courts to use a specific method of
statutory interpretation, but simply dictates that courts should use the
“traditional tools of statutory construction.”119 Such tools might encompass

(emphasis in original).
116
467 U.S. 837 (1984).
117
Id. at 842–43.
118
Id. at 843.
119
Elizabeth Garrett, Step One of Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, in A
GUIDE TO JUDICIAL AND POLITICAL REVIEW OF FEDERAL AGENCIES 55, 57 (John F. Duffy &
Michael Herz eds., 2005).
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the actual text of the statute, dictionary definitions, the structure of the
statute, legislative purpose, as well as legislative history.120
It is well established in U.S. statutory interpretation that a court will not
examine any extrinsic sources unless there is ambiguity in the actual text of
the statute.121 Assuming for the moment that Section 129(c)(1) is
ambiguous, the next question is whether legislative history should be
consulted, and if yes, what legislative history? Although most judges
examine legislative history at step one of a Chevron analysis, some judges
refuse to examine legislative history at all; this is particularly true of those
judges who consider themselves to be textualists.122
Of course, these questions of statutory construction and interpretation
lead to the inescapable question of how exactly the SAA should be
characterized, since the answer will have a large impact on how a court
would analyze this issue. At this point in the analysis there are four paths
down which a court may go: (1) a court might consider the SAA to be neither
a part of the URAA statute itself nor legislative history, but something
different altogether, something sui generis, in which case it is indeterminable
what role the SAA would play in interpreting the language of Section
129(c)(1); (2) a court could consider the SAA to be a form of legislative
history, albeit a unique form, but because of reasons contrary to public
policy/comity or unconstitutionality, or some combination thereof, the SAA
would be deemed largely irrelevant in a Chevron analysis; (3) a court could
consider the SAA as a traditional form of legislative history and use it at step
one of a Chevron analysis to determine the meaning of the plain language of
Section 129(c)(1); or (4) a court could again consider the SAA to be a
legitimate form of legislative history, but would ignore it for precisely this
reason at step one of a Chevron analysis.
The first possibility is that the SAA is something completely unique in a
statutory scheme, something sui generis, which is not legislative history.
“While the SAA is clearly an extrinsic source, whether it may be classified
as legislative history depends on how one defines the term.”123 As stated
above, the SAA is the only interpretative source of Section 129(c)(1) of the
URAA.124 Thus, if a court were to go down this first possible path, the SAA
120

Id.
Buys & Isasi, supra note 97, at 105.
122
Garrett, supra note 119, at 63. See, e.g., Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 519 (1993)
(Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that use of legislative history when interpreting a statute
“undermines the clarity of law, and condemns litigants . . . to subsidizing historical research
by lawyers”).
123
Buys & Isasi, supra note 97, at 107.
124
See id. at 83 (noting that the Congress has mandated application of the SAA).
121
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might be excluded on the grounds that it is not legislative history, leaving no
other choice but to analyze step one simply by examining the plain language
of the statute. However, a textualist court could just as easily use this
classification of the SAA as reason to more readily refer to it in a step one
analysis. One reason the SAA might not be considered as legislative history
per se is that it was written almost entirely by the Executive Branch.125
Alternatively, one could consider the SAA as part of the broader
“institutional progress of a bill to enactment,” by classifying Executive
Branch contributions to statutory crafting as legislative history.126 In
addition, although it was primarily the Executive Branch that created the
language for the SAA, it was done in conjunction with Congress.127
The second possibility is that, like the first, a court would consider the
SAA to be something truly unique; but courts may interpret this fact
negatively and consider the SAA largely irrelevant as unconstitutional or
included in the statutory scheme for illegitimate reasons. Buys and Isasi note
that one reason the SAA might not have been incorporated into statutory law
is because the actual language of the URAA, which under WTO law was put
under notice for examination by other WTO countries, was closely examined
by other WTO agreement signatories, while the language of the SAA was not
subject to such scrutiny.128 In addition, it has often been said that many parts
of the SAA were included in order to appease domestic interest groups,
leading to an increased likelihood that the URAA can be construed to
conflict with the WTO agreements in a number of ways.129 Buys and Isasi
take this position, arguing that either of these reasons should give a court
pause before giving the SAA too much weight.130
Although this
categorization of the SAA would be beneficial to the DOC because
completely ignoring the SAA would render the text of Section 129(c)(1)
much more ambiguous, this is also probably the least likely scenario of the
four. Ever since the URAA was passed, courts have made reference to the
SAA and the interpretive weight it provides. Thus, it seems unlikely a court
will strike down wholesale the SAA as unconstitutional or somehow contrary
to U.S. public policy at this point in time.131
125

Id.
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES
AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 920 (3d ed. 2001).
127
Buys & Isasi, supra note 97, at 83.
128
Id. at 112–13 (explaining that the URAA was subject to scrutiny by other signatories of
the WTO Agreements under the notice requirements of the WTO Agreements).
129
Id.
130
See id. at 113.
131
Although not impossible. See Linda D. Jellum, “Which is to be Master,” the Judiciary
or the Legislature? When Statutory Directives Violate Separation of Powers, 56 U.C.L.A. L.
126
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The third and fourth possibilities are both based on the assumption that a
court would consider the SAA to be a traditional form of legislative history,
akin to a debate surrounding the passage of a bill found in the Congressional
Record. The third possibility is that a court would use the SAA, the only piece
of legislative history available for the URAA, as an aid in interpreting the
language of Section 129(c)(1). Given what has already been said about using
“traditional tools of statutory construction”132 at step one of a Chevron
analysis, this outcome may seem inevitable at first glance, unless a textualist
judge who completely refused to reference legislative history were deciding
the case. Upon referencing the SAA, it would appear hard for a court to
conclude that the DOC can recalculate and offer refunds. However, it is not a
foregone conclusion that a court would reference legislative history at step one
of a Chevron analysis.
This leads to the fourth and final possibility—that
despite its categorization as a piece of typical legislative history, the SAA
would be ignored at step one of a Chevron analysis for precisely that reason.
This is because of a strain of judicial thought, most prominent on the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals, as expressed in United States v. Geiser, which holds
that “the current state of Supreme Court and Third Circuit jurisprudence
demonstrates that legislative history should not be considered at Chevron step
one. . . . We determine whether Congress has ‘unambiguously expressed its
intent’ by looking at the ‘plain’ and ‘literal’ language of the statute.”133 Thus,
taking the Third Circuit’s position, as long as the SAA can be categorized as
legislative history akin to congressional floor debates, it will be excluded when
determining “whether Congress has ‘unambiguously expressed its intent’ ” in a
Chevron analysis.134 Granted, this is an emerging rule, one which the Supreme
Court may not agree with under its own interpretation of Chevron and its
progeny—the Court has yet to decide the issue since the Third Circuit’s
holding in 2008—but it likely presents the best argument the DOC has in order
to overcome the SAA hurdle. In addition, since the Court denied certiorari in
Geiser, one can safely assume the Court did not see any basis for reversing the
Third Circuit’s decision.

REV. 837, 837 (2009) (arguing that “when the legislature tries to control the process of
interpretation [through statutory directives], as opposed to trying to influence the outcome of
interpretation to promote specific policy objectives, the legislature aggrandizes itself,
oversteps constitutional boundaries, impermissibly intrudes into the judicial sphere, and
become master of the interpretive process”).
132
Garrett, supra note 119.
133
United States v. Geiser, 527 F.3d 288, 294 (3d Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 1102
(2009) (citation omitted).
134
Id.
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Aside from legislative history, courts may also look to interpretations of a
statute by the executive branch.135 An agency’s interpretation of a statute is
itself evidence of what the statute means; this is distinct from the deference
given to reasonable agency interpretations at step two of a Chevron
analysis.136 It should also be noted that an initial agency interpretation of a
statute is not binding on the agency. 137 Thus, although the DOC argued in
previous cases that Section 129(c)(1) permits the DOC to choose not to
retroactively calculate and provide refunds, the DOC never foreclosed the
possibility that it would one day wish to choose the alternative so that it
could provide refunds. In other words, the agency is allowed to change its
mind with regard to its interpretation of a statute.
Of course, the entire SAA discussion, and to a large extent the deference
given to agency interpretation at step one, is a moot point if a court were to
decide that the plain language of Section 129(c)(1), that is the text of the
URAA itself, is unambiguous. Therefore, in order for the DOC to prevail at
step one of a Chevron analysis it would need to convince a court that the
language of the provision is at least ambiguous. At this point, it is worth
explicitly stating the language of the provision at issue:
Determinations concerning title VII of the Tariff Act of 1930
that are implemented under this section shall apply with respect
to unliquidated entries of the subject merchandise . . . that are
entered, or withdrawn from warehouse, for consumption on or
after — (A) in the case of a determination by the Commission
under subsection (a)(4), the date on which the Trade
Representative directs the administering authority under
subsection (a)(6) to revoke an order pursuant to that
determination, and (B) in the case of a determination by the
administering authority under subsection (b)(2), the date on
which the Trade Representative directs the administering
authority under subsection (b)(4) to implement that
determination.138
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In order for its interpretation to survive a Chevron analysis, the DOC will
need a court to consider the above language ambiguous enough with regards
to the DOC’s ability to retroactively calculate prior unliquidated entries and
provide refunds to importers.
Convincing a court that the statutory language is ambiguous is perhaps
the toughest hurdle for the DOC to overcome, even more so than getting the
SAA characterized as legislative history in order to exclude it from step one
of a Chevron analysis. Although a court can use an agency’s interpretation
of a statute as a method of statutory interpretation,139 courts are also aware
that agencies might have an incentive to read into legislation a favorable
narrative of legislative intent, and a court will not defer to an agency’s
interpretation if it is clearly contrary to a statute’s plain and unambiguous
meaning.140 It is likely that the DOC’s best argument to convince a court the
statutory language is ambiguous is that goods entering the U.S. prior to the
USTR directing the DOC to implement the new methodology’s results are
the first products in a so-called “cycle of entry,” and that the language about
USTR directing implementation is merely a placeholder saying, in essence,
that determinations to implement adverse DSU holdings will apply to
subsequent “cycles” of imports.141 This argument might be enough to
persuade a court to find this language at least somewhat ambiguous.
At this point in the step one analysis, three “tools of statutory
construction” have been examined: the plain language of the statute,
legislative history (or lack thereof), and deference to agency interpretation.
However, the canons of statutory construction are one tool that has yet to be
sufficiently examined, particularly the substantive canons of statutory
construction.142 Substantive canons are canons of statutory construction that
are meant to embody and advance designated policy values.143 It is with the
substantive canon of statutory construction known as Charming Betsy, that
the final mode of analysis under step one of the Chevron doctrine is now
examined.
The Charming Betsy doctrine is the result of an 1804 U.S. Supreme Court
case and states that “an act of Congress ought never to be construed to
139
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original investigation to the end of the investigatory cycle.
142
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violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains.”144
Charming Betsy is a substantive canon that “requires courts to interpret
statutes consistently with international law absent a clear statement of
congressional intent.”145 The Supreme Court has determined that this canon
points “against finding implicit repeal of a treaty in ambiguous congressional
action.”146 This holding is important because the WTO regime itself,
including its DSU, can be considered an international agreement to which the
U.S. is bound.147 Thus, Charming Betsy would appear to disallow failure to
comply with a DSB decision. There is an ongoing academic debate about
how, in light of the emergence of the Chevron framework of agency
deference, Charming Betsy should influence agency attempts to interpret
statutes in accordance with the WTO decisions and international law.148 That
being said, using Charming Betsy as at least a partial justification for
permitting an agency to interpret a statute in accordance with a WTO
Appellate Body decision is not necessarily foreclosed.
The treatment that courts, particularly the CIT and the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit, have given Charming Betsy with regards to
harmonizing agency interpretations of domestic statutes with WTO
Appellate Body decisions, is somewhat convoluted. At first glance, the
URAA would seem to prohibit an application of Charming Betsy that would
harmonize interpretations of U.S. law with WTO DSU decisions, because the
URAA explicitly states that “[n]o provision of any of the Uruguay Round
Agreements, nor the application of any such provision to any person or
circumstance, that is inconsistent with any law of the United States shall
have effect.”149 Following this mandate, the CIT has held that the U.S. still
has obligations at an international level because it is a signatory to the
Marrakesh Agreement, regardless of the fact that this agreement was not
self-executing and therefore required implementing legislation in the form of
the URAA in the United States.150 In addition, the CIT has on numerous
occasions distinguished a seemingly applicable WTO agreement or
144
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Appellate Body ruling vis-à-vis the domestic interpretation, thereby
foreclosing any use of Charming Betsy and rendering the URAA Supremacy
Clause obsolete, as if it were looking to avoid a potential conflict.151 The
court did not once justify its decision by noting the supremacy of domestic
statutes to WTO law as mandated by the URAA Supremacy Clause.152 Thus,
based on CIT jurisprudence, it is unclear whether one could conclude that if
the U.S. has an obligation under international law—in this case, a WTO DSB
decision—an ambiguous statute should be read as being in conformity with
that obligation under the Charming Betsy canon.153 The CIT’s jurisprudence
up to this point at least seems to indicate that such an application is not out of
the realm of possibility.
On the other hand, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has
held that “[n]either the GATT nor any enabling international agreement
outlining compliance therewith . . . trumps domestic legislation; if U.S.
statutory provisions are inconsistent with the GATT or an enabling
agreement, it is strictly a matter for Congress.”154 The court also stated that
the WTO’s decisions do not create binding law for the U.S., and that because
the URAA laid out a framework for the question at issue in that case, the
court would not defer to the decisions of the DSU.155 However, as Canizares
points out “[t]he Federal Circuit’s reading of the URAA is flawed, if it stands
for the proposition that courts are statutorily prohibited from construing the
statute in harmony with the WTO/GATT agreements under Charming
Betsy.”156 While “[i]t is axiomatic that Congress is free to legislate in
violation of international law,”157 Charming Betsy can be helpful when “it
tells us that an ambiguous statute should be read to avoid violating
international law, which includes relevant provisions of WTO/GATT
agreements.”158 However, at least one case159 suggests that the Federal
151
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Circuit has taken the opposite approach. In Turtle Island Restoration
Network v. Evans, the court deferred to the State Department’s interpretation
of a statute under a Chevron analysis.160 The State Department supported its
interpretation with evidence that the WTO Appellate Body issued a ruling
that was congruent with the agency’s interpretation of the statute.161
Although the majority did not reference Charming Betsy in its analysis,
Judge Newman wrote in her dissent that a Charming Betsy analysis with
respect to harmonizing an agency’s interpretation of a domestic statute with a
WTO Appellate Body decision was expressly forbidden by the URAA
Supremacy Clause, arguing that “neither [the court] nor the State Department
has authority to rewrite the statute.”162 Commentators argue that such a
strong objection from Judge Newman “suggests that the WTO and Charming
Betsy had an unacknowledged impact on the majority decision.”163
To summarize the entire Chevron step one analysis, in order to determine
whether the statutory meaning is clear and thus not ambiguous, a court will
take into account (1) the text of the statute itself; (2) canons of statutory
interpretation; (3) the agency’s interpretation of permissible conduct under
the statute; and possibly (4) legislative history. Although most courts would
likely use legislative history at step one, this Note urges the DOC to argue
for the position taken by the Third Circuit with regard to using legislative
history at step one of a Chevron analysis, which is not to use it. However,
this only matters if the SAA is considered to be a traditional piece of
legislative history, which would be the case under either the third or fourth
view espoused by this Note concerning how a court would categorize the
SAA, i.e., either using the SAA or ignoring it because it is considered
traditional legislative history. It seems more than likely that the SAA would
be considered a piece of traditional legislative history. However, if the Third
Circuit’s view is rejected, the SAA will be referenced when analyzing the
meaning of Section 129(c)(1). Should that happen, it is almost certain that
the DOC will lose its legal argument. In addition to these tools of statutory
construction, the substantive statutory interpretation canon of Charming
Betsy can be used to err on the side of not offending international law, i.e.,
the WTO and its DSU decisions. However, this canon can only legitimately
be argued if the text of the statute is sufficiently ambiguous, the reasons for
which are outlined above. If all of the above tools are utilized and a court
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finds that the language of Section 129(c)(1) is ambiguous, the analysis
proceeds to step two.
2. Step Two of the Chevron Analysis
At this point in the analysis, the key questions are “what constitutes a
reasonable or permissible construction of a statute, or what materials [is] a
court required to consider in making that determination . . . ?”164 In reality,
an agency’s interpretation is rarely struck down at the second step of a
Chevron analysis, which makes it difficult to ascertain the relative weight
given to interpretive tools used by a court.165 Once a court reaches step two
in a Chevron analysis, the agency’s interpretation is usually upheld, “often in
a perfunctory way.”166 Therefore, a step two analysis will largely mirror a
step one analysis, with the additional analysis of the agency’s reasoning
process.167 Because a step one analysis has already been conducted in this
Note, this section will focus on this additional mode of analysis.
A court’s analysis under this rubric largely boils down to the following
question: is the agency’s interpretation logically coherent? At this step,
courts often look at the reasonableness of the agency’s interpretation, which
is for all intents and purposes the same as an “arbitrary and capricious
review” that would be conducted under the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA).168 It is clear here that the DOC’s interpretation would be logically
coherent because it would not pass step one analysis if it were not.
Therefore, under step two, a court could find the DOC’s interpretation to be
reasonable.
It is, therefore, possible for the DOC to survive a Chevron analysis, albeit
not as likely as it is to fail. There are, in short, serious potential pitfalls that
prohibit the DOC from being confident it could sustain an interpretation that
recalculating the AD duties for prior unliquidated entries and providing
refunds to importers is permissible. For one, a court might simply consider
the plain language of Section 129(c)(1) to unambiguously forbid such an
interpretation. Absent that, a court may simply look to the SAA for an even
164
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GUIDE TO JUDICIAL AND POLITICAL REVIEW OF FEDERAL AGENCIES 85, 86 (John F. Duffy &
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clearer message from Congress about its intent when passing Section
129(c)(1), as so many other courts have done. If the DOC can avoid both
these lethal pitfalls, then it can survive a Chevron analysis. However, the
DOC would not yet be free to start recalculating and providing refunds
because recent decisions by the federal courts.
IV. CONCLUSION
The DOC cannot rely on Congress to help it with this issue. Concerns
over national sovereignty will not allow members of Congress the freedom to
do so. Thus, the DOC must be able to formulate a legal argument under
existing law that enables it to provide refunds for prior unliquidated entries
after a recalculation of AD duties using WTO-consistent methodologies.
While the URAA’s Section 129(c)(1) may at first glance appear to prohibit
the DOC from retroactively calculating prior unliquidated entries using a
WTO-consistent methodology and providing refunds to the importers, there
are certain tools of U.S. administrative law and statutory construction which
allow the DOC to make a strong case that it can. To summarize the
argument, the DOC should try to remove the SAA from a court’s view,
preferably by categorizing it as legislative history and arguing for the Third
Circuit’s approach of disregarding legislative history at step one of a
Chevron analysis. In the alternative, the DOC could argue that the SAA
itself is unconstitutional or contrary to public policy or both. Next, after
establishing that the Section 129(c)(1) provision is ambiguous, the DOC
should use the statutory canon of Charming Betsy to argue that deference
should be given to its interpretation which aligns DOC’s conduct with
international law, i.e., decisions by the WTO’s DSU.
The consequences of the DOC’s failure to comply with the WTO’s
rulings are very important. If the United States does not comply, WTOmember countries will be allowed, under WTO law, to impose retaliatory
trade measures against the U.S. In addition, such conduct will show a lack of
commitment on the part of the U.S., not only to the WTO scheme, but to
cooperation in international trade generally. Therefore, the DOC should do
its best to comply with these rulings and the wishes of the victorious
countries.

